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Abstract
In this paper, I propose a new framework to study the intertemporal labor supply
hypothesis. I use an exogenous source of variation in maternal net earning opportunities,
generated through school entrance age of children, to study intertemporal labor supply
behavior. Employing data from the 1980 US Census and the NLSY, I estimate the e¤ect
of a one year delay in school attendance on long run maternal labor supply. To deal with
the endogeneity of school attendance age, I exploit the variation in child month of birth
and state kindergarten entrance age laws.
IV estimates imply that having a 5 year old enrolled in school increases labor supply
measures for married women, with no younger children, by between 7 to 34 percent. In
contrast to the results for married mothers, I do not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect
on labor market outcomes for single mothers or mothers of 5 year olds with additional
younger children. Further, using a sample of 7 to 10 year olds from the NLSY, I investigate
persistence in employment outcomes for a married mother whose child delayed school
entry. The estimates suggest that delayed school enrollment has long run implications
for maternal labor supply. Results point towards signicant intertemporal substitution
in labor supply. Rough calculations yield an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.76 and
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1.1.
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1 Introduction
The intertemporal labor supply hypothesis states that leisure is easily substitutable across
periods. Hence, small and temporary movements in the perceived real wage induce individuals
to allocate their time in a way such that periods of high labor supply coincide with periods of
high transitory wages. The standard measure of this e¤ect is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution which is predicted to be positive so that individuals work more during periods
of high wages holding the marginal utility of wealth constant. A key concern, however,
in estimating labor supply elasticities is that it is hard to nd temporary and exogenous
movements in real wages that can identify movements in labor supply. In the absence of
good instruments for wage changes, most studies of intertemporal labor supply treat wages
as exogenous.
In this paper, I use an exogenous source of variation in maternal net earning opportuni-
ties, generated through school entrance age of children, to study intertemporal labor supply
behavior. Changes in maternal labour supply, over time, are determined, to a large extent,
by the process of substitution between market and household work associated with bringing
up children. In the absence of informal sources of child care, most parents have to incur child
care costs in order to become employed. One of the biggest sources of child care subsidies for
parents is the availability of schools. A child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized
kindergarten, increases the likelihood of employment by increasing a mothers net wage at
the employment margin. This implies that delaying entry to school may impose an additional
year of child care for the mother and consequently a year less in the labor market. The main
aim of this paper is to measure the extent to which mothers respond to this additional year
of child care costs by substituting current work for future work. The identication strategy
relies on comparing labor supply responses, over time, for two groups of women; those whose
5 year olds were enrolled in kindergarten and those who delayed enrollment of their child to
age 6.
Uncovering the causal relation between age at enrollment and maternal labor supply is
problematic because unobserved characteristics of parents and children are correlated with
school entrance age. To deal with the endogeneity of school entrance age and, therefore, to
identify the causal e¤ect of delayed school entry, I exploit the exogenous variation in child
month of birth and state kindergarten entrance age laws.
This paper adds to the growing body of literature that examine how public preschool
availability a¤ects maternal labor supply (Baker, Gruber and Milligan 2005; Berlinski and
Galiani 2005; Cascio 2006; Gelbach 2002; Schlosser 2005). The contribution of this paper
to this literature is twofold. First, I look at the e¤ect of delayed school entry on long run
maternal labor market outcomes as opposed to focusing only on a single period estimate. To
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my knowledge, this is the rst study that explores the dynamic aspect of the school entry
age and maternal labor supply relation. Second, I allow for the fact that some mothers may
benet from delaying school enrollment of their children while others may be hurt by it.
The estimation strategy provides consistent estimates of the Local Average Treatment E¤ect
(LATE) of entrance age on outcomes (Angrist and Imbens, 1994) even if there is heterogeneity
in the entrance age e¤ect.
This paper also contributes to the literature that uses natural experiments and di¤erences-
in-di¤erences methods to study intertemporal labor supply1. Unlike those studies, I abstract
from wage considerations and employ an alternative to directly inferring the intertemporal
substitution e¤ect from the relation between wages and labor supply. By examining the
labor supply response to a variation in net earning opportunities that is credibly exogenous,
I am able to estimate the extent of intertemporal substitution in maternal labor supply. In
addition, the empirical strategy gives me a simple method to isolate substitution e¤ects from
wealth e¤ects.
Using data from the US Census 1980 PUMS, I nd that married women whose youngest
child is 5 years old increase their labor supply by 7-34 percentage points if their ve year
old is enrolled in school. In contrast to the results for married mothers, there is no statisti-
cally signicant e¤ect on labor market outcomes for single mothers or mothers with younger
than ve year old children. Further, using a sample of 7 to 10 year old children from the
NLSY, I investigate persistence in employment outcomes for a married mother whose child
delayed school entry. Results obtained from analyzing the two data sets suggest signicant
intertemporal substitution in labor supply. In particular, when evaluated at age 7 to 10, the
labor supply of a mother whose child delayed school entry increases by 12 percentage points
relative to that of the mother whose child went to school at age 5. This increase can be
attributed to a pure wealth e¤ect. Rough calculations yield an uncompensated labor supply
elasticity of 0.76, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.1 and a wealth elasticity of
-0.37.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical
background that explores the relation between school entrance age and intertemporal mater-
nal labor supply. In Section III, I address identication issues as well as outline the empirical
model used in the baseline regressions. Section IV discusses data and sample selection is-
sues and presents some summary statistics. Section V presents the main ndings and results
obtained from the baseline models. Finally, I conclude the discussion in section VI with a
particular emphasis on implications for education policy .
1See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3A for a review of these studies.
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2 School Entrance Age and Intertemporal Maternal Labor
Supply: Theoretical Background
The main issue in the empirical estimation of the intertemporal labor supply elasticities is
the endogeneity of intertemporal wage changes since labor supply today depends on past
and expected future wages. In the absence of a good instrument, most studies treat wages
as exogenous or use age and education related variables as instruments for life cycle wage
changes (Altonji, 1986).
Recently several researchers have used natural experiments and di¤erences-in-di¤erences
approach to estimate intertemporal labor supply using cross-sectional variation in wages.
The main motive behind these empirical strategies is to exploit certain life cycle events or
policy changes that generate exogenous and anticipated wage changes that can be used to
estimate intertemporal elasticities. Mulligan (1999) uses the termination of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) as a life cycle event that causes an anticipated wage shock
to study changes in labor supply over time. Several studies have used di¤erences-in-di¤erences
estimates to measure the e¤ect of tax reforms on labor supply (Eissa, 1995,1996; Eissa and
Liebman, 1995; Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998). However, there are serious concerns
of selection bias and the possible endogenous nature of wage changes in these studies. In
addition, the choice of control groups is questionable in most of these studies.
In this paper, I propose a new framework to study the intertemporal labor supply hy-
pothesis. A child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized kindergarten, increases a
mothers e¤ective wage at the employment margin. At the same time, there exists a lot of
variation in the age at which a child may begin school. Thus, school entrance ages provide
an exogenous source of variation in the net earning opportunities for a mother. I exploit this
variation to study intertemporal labor supply behavior among mothers of school age children.
Before explaining the empirical strategy, it would be worthwhile to understand how school
entrance age a¤ects maternal labor supply within a multiperiod context.
In a recent study, Gelbach (1999) shows that for mothers who would otherwise have not
worked, free public school enrollment provides a 100% price subsidy for child care at the
margin. This would increase her e¤ective wage at the employment margin increasing the
price of leisure relative to the price of consumption. This, in turn, would make her substitute
towards work and away from leisure2.
However, not all women receive this subsidy at the same time. This is because children
enter school at di¤erent ages depending upon parental preferences and/or state laws governing
2For women who would choose to work more hours than the length of the school day, public school
enrollment would be like an income transfer equal to the number of hours spent in school times the market
hourly price of child care. Thus the budget set has a kink at the point that represents the length of the school
day. Women located at the kink receive both a price subsidy and an income subsidy.
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kindergarten entrance ages. In the United States, state laws require a child to turn ve by
the state cut-o¤ date to be eligible to attend kindergarten in the beginning of the academic
year, usually, in September. As a consequence children born just before the state cut-o¤
are almost a year younger, when they enter kindergarten, relative to children born after the
cut-o¤. For example in California, where the cut-o¤ is December 2nd, the youngest child in a
class (born on December 1st) would be allowed to enter kindergarten in September when he
is just four years and nine months old compared to the oldest child (born after the cut-o¤)
who would be exactly a year older. In Indiana where the cut-o¤ is July 1st, the youngest
child in a class would be ve years and two months old when he enters school in September.
This di¤erence in chronological age between the youngest and the oldest kindergartner also
generates variation in the time period at which a mother receives the implicit child care
subsidy. This is shown in the gure below that illustrates the wage proles of two mothers
who are identical in all observable characteristics but di¤er in the age at which they send
their child to school.
ln (Wt)
t    t+1 Age of the Child
A
 B
C
D
E
  F
Figure 1: Wage Profile of a Constrained and an Unconstrained
Woman
The "constrained" woman refers to the mother whose child begins kindergarten at age 6
while the "unconstrained" refers to a mother who sends her child to school at age 5. The life
cycle wage proles of the two women are identical except at the time period t that corresponds
to the year the child turns 5. At time t, the unconstrained mother receives a child care subsidy
in the form of free or subsidized schooling that increases her e¤ective wage causing her wage
prole to shift upwards (given by the curve ABCD). In period t + 1, corresponding to the
year the child turns 6, the constrained mother also receives this subsidy and her wage prole
shifts up by the same amount (the curve AEFD). Note that an implicit assumption in this
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analysis is that there is no loss in human capital accumulation. Given the wage proles of the
two women, how would their labor supply di¤er over the life cycle assuming an environment
of perfect certainty?
Theoretically (MaCurdy,1981), labor supplied by the two women would di¤er over their
life-cycle because of two reasons. First, in response to the higher net wages at period t the
unconstrained mother would increase her labor supply relative to the labor supplied by the
constrained mother. She adjusts her labor supply in response to intertemporal wage changes
along her life cycle wage prole keeping lifetime wealth constant. This labor supply response
to intertemporal wage changes along an individuals life cycle wage prole is measured by
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution . The total increase in labor supply at period
t due to this e¤ect is given by the absolute value of di¤erence between the net wages times
the intertemporal elasticity : There is, however, an additional e¤ect on labor supply. The
unconstrained mother has higher lifetime wealth relative to the constrained mother given by
the area BEFC in gure 1 above. This implies that at all periods her labor supply will be
lower than the labor supplied by the constrained mother. This represents a pure wealth e¤ect
associated with higher lifetime income. The sign on the e¤ect of the subsidy on labor supply
at period t is ambiguous and depends upon the strength of the substitution and the wealth
e¤ects.
3 Empirical Issues and Identication Strategy
Empirically identifying the causal e¤ect of school enrollment age on maternal labor market
outcomes is challenging due to the endogeneity of entrance age. Ideally, one can estimate the
e¤ect of kindergarten attendance on maternal labor supply using the following equation:
Yi = Si +X
0
i + i
Where Yi measures maternal labor supply outcomes, Si is an indicator for whether the
child is attending kindergarten at age 5 and Xi is a vector of controls. The causal inter-
pretation depends on the assumption that E[SiijXi] = 0. However, there are two potential
sources of bias in the OLS estimates of the e¤ect of entrance age on maternal labor supply.
First, entrance age is correlated with parental and child unobservable characteristics that may
themselves be directly related to maternal labor market outcomes. For instance, parents are
more likely to delay school entry for a child with learning disabilities. At the same time,
mothers of such children are also less likely to work. Therefore, if we do not control for the
unobserved ability of a child, we would overestimate the negative e¤ect of school entrance
age on the mothers labor supply. A second source of bias in the estimated coe¢ cients may
also be due to the simultaneity of school entrance age and parental labor supply. The OLS
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estimate of school entrance age on maternal labor supply may be contaminated by the fact
that career oriented women may be sending their children to school early so that their labor
supply is not adversely a¤ected by an additional year of child care. Thus, depending on the
importance of these two factors and the variables for which we control, the sign of the overall
bias could go in either direction.
In the existing literature, there are at least two strategies that researchers have used to
infer causality from the school attendance and maternal labor supply relation. One identi-
cation strategy exploits variation in the availability of public schools across states and over
time. Cascio (2006) used variation in preschool availability from the introduction of kinder-
garten in the United States to study the e¤ect of child care on maternal labor supply. Using a
Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences (DD) approach, she nds that single women with kindergarten eli-
gible children, but no younger children, were more likely to be employed with the availability
of kindergartens. Schlosser (2005) exploits a Israeli policy change that introduced free public
preschool for children aged 3 and 4 to study the e¤ect on labor supply of Arab mothers. She
nds an increase in labor supply as a consequence of the availability of free public schools
amongst more educated mothers. Berlinski and Galiani (2005) provide evidence of increased
maternal employment in Argentina as a result of large construction of pre-primary school
facilities. Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2005) look at the e¤ect of increased public nancing
for child care under Canadas "$5 per day child care" program on a range of outcomes in-
cluding maternal labor supply. Each of these studies nds some evidence that increase in the
availability of preschools raises maternal employment, at least, for single mothers of preschool
age children with no younger children.
An alternative identication strategy is instrumental variable estimation of the e¤ect
of age at enrollment on maternal labor supply. One widely used instrument is quarter of
birth or, more generally, month of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Gelbach, 2002; Mayer
and Knutson, 1999). If students are allowed to enter school in the year that they turn ve,
children born in the later part of the year will be less likely to be enrolled in school. Assuming
that month of birth is not correlated with unobservable characteristics, we can use month of
birth as a valid instrument for age at enrollment. Using quarter of birth as an instrument
for public school enrollment of ve year old children, Gelbach (2002) nds that women with
kindergarten eligible children worked more hours.
The validity of quarter of birth as an instrument has been criticized on grounds of po-
tential failure of the exclusion restriction (Bound and Jaeger, 2000). If quarter of birth is to
be a valid instrument, it must be related to maternal labor market outcomes only because it
a¤ects the age of enrollment of the child. However, several studies that estimate the patterns
in birth seasonality nd that births are highly seasonal with great variation in the timing
of seasonal patterns across populations (Lam and Miron, 1991). Bound and Jaeger (2000)
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present evidence in favor of correlations between season of birth and family background, edu-
cation, and earnings. Bobak & Gjonca (2001) nd that the magnitude of seasonal variation in
births was particularly strongly associated with maternal socio-demographic characteristics.
This evidence suggests that maternal employment may be directly related to month of birth
of a child. For instance, in occupations that are characterized by seasonalities in labor de-
mand, it has been found that more babies are born in seasons of less work load (Nurge,1970).
Similarly, women in professional jobs may avoid births during the end of the scal year when
the work load is very heavy.
In this paper I propose an identication strategy that is not subject to the above criticism.
To identify the causal e¤ect of school entrance age, I exploit the exogenous variation in child
month of birth and state kindergarten entrance age laws.
Consider the following model of the relation between age at enrollment and maternal
labor market outcomes:
Yit = tSi +X
0
it + tMi + tRi + it; t = 5; 7; ::; 10 (1)
Where, Yit is maternal labor supply measures for mother i when the child is t years old.
Si is a dummy variable indicating whether the child was enrolled in school in the year he
turned ve (Si = 0) or had delayed entry to age 6 (Si = 1). Mi is a set of dummies indication
the quarter of birth or the month of birth of the child. Xi is a vector of observable individual
characteristics and Ri represents a set of demographic controls. All models are estimated
separately by the age of the child. As discussed earlier, the age at which a child starts school
is endogenous causing the OLS estimates of  to be biased. To control for this endogeneity,
I propose an instrumental variable estimation strategy.
I use 2SLS estimates to identify  in equation (1) above where Si is instrumented using
a dummy variable Zi that takes on a value of one if the law constrained the child to delay
entry into kindergarten. In other words if the childs month of birth lies later than the state
kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ date, Zi equals one and zero otherwise. More formally, I
estimate the parameters of equation (1) using 2SLS based on the following rst-stage equation
for observed enrollment:
Si = tZi +X
0
it + 'tMi + tRi + it; t = 5; 7; ::; 10 (2)
All specications include controls for the month of birth of a child to take into account
the season of birth e¤ects. In addition, I control for state of residence to take into account
any state di¤erences in maternal employment opportunities.
This is not the rst study that uses variation in state kindergarten entrance age laws
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and month of birth to instrument for actual entrance age. Recently several researchers
have exploited the cross state variation in school entrance age laws and variation in date of
birth to instrument for actual entry age (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Cascio and Lewis, 2005;
Datar, 2005; Elder and Lubotsky, 2006; McCrary and Royer, 2005). However, these studies
have looked at the e¤ect of school entry age on child outcomes. This is the rst study that
exploits the state laws and month of birth variation to look at long run maternal labor market
outcomes. In addition, as discussed extensively in Barua and Lang (2007), in the presence
of heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects it is not clear which treatment parameter those studies
are able to identify. If there is heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects, the instrument used here
identies (under some reasonable assumptions) the Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE)
i.e. the labor supply e¤ect on those women who decide to delay school entry only because
the law constrains them to do so.
I implement the above empirical strategy in the following way. First, I estimate the e¤ect
of a ve year olds school enrollment on maternal labor supply. Next, I explore long run
outcomes by estimating equation (1) using 2SLS for a sample of 7 to 10 year old children.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 US 1980 Census
The data for 5 year old children is drawn from 1980 US Census 5% Public Use Microdata
(PUMS). Since the Census day in 1980 was April 1st, I restrict the sample to 5 year olds
who were born in quarters two through four and 6 year old children born in the rst quarter
(i.e. those who turned 5 in 1979). A children le was created for each household with
corresponding information on the childs characteristics and mothers information.
For the analysis with ve year old children, the main explanatory variable is the school
attendance dummy variable. I use the census school attendance variable where I code atten-
dance as 1 if the child is attending a public, private or church related private school. The
dummy is coded as zero is the child is not enrolled in any school. Though school entry age
laws do not directly a¤ect attendance for children who go to private schools, I choose to
keep them in the sample because the attendance pattern of these children are likely to be
inuenced by state laws. Some parents may send their children to private schools to get
around the strict cuto¤s imposed by public schools. In addition, the decision to send a child
to a private school would also directly depend upon the availability of public schools.
While the Census provides accurate information on attendance for those children who
turned 5 in 1979, it cannot be used to study the e¤ect of prior school attendance on older
children. This is because the Census does not report school entrance age of respondents.
School entrance age can still be computed for each child using grade information if I assume
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that no child repeats or skips a grade. However, entrance age computed using this method
will be distorted because of prevalence of grade repeaters. To circumvent this data limitation,
I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate the e¤ect of delayed
school entry on long run maternal labor supply measures. The NLSY sample is discussed in
detail in the next subsection.
The ideal instrument for this analysis would exploit variation in exact date of birth and
state laws. But the census does not have month of birth information in the public use les.
Instead I use information on quarter of birth and state laws to determine whether the law
required a child to delay entry into kindergarten from the year he turned ve to the year he
turned six. I deleted observations for whom I could not determine whether the child was born
before or after the state cut-o¤. For example, I dropped children born in the third quarter
who went to kindergarten in states with a mid-third quarter cut-o¤. Similarly the sample
does not include children who are born in the fourth quarter in states with a mid-fourth
quarter cut o¤.
I estimate the equations separately for married mothers and single mothers between the
age of 21 to 50. The census has extensive information on maternal characteristics, family
background and schooling, allowing me to include a rich set of controls in the baseline re-
gressions. All specications control for quarter of birth of the child and state of residence. I
also control for a quadratic function of the mothers age, her race, education, SMSA dummy,
log of spouseincome, number of children, number of adult family members and whether she
is the head of the household.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the census regressions.
Means and standard deviations are reported for the three samples on which the census analysis
is based, namely, (i) married mothers whose youngest child is age 5, (ii) single mothers whose
youngest child is age 5 and (iii) married mothers of 5 year old children who also have additional
younger children. As would be expected, single mothers of ve year old children work more
than married mothers whose youngest child is ve, are more likely to be household heads, less
likely to be white, have fewer adult members in the household and are younger on average.
4.2 NLSY79
As discussed earlier, the census does not have school entrance age information. To study the
long run e¤ects of delayed school entry on maternal labor supply of married mothers, I use
data from NLSY79. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY79) is a
panel survey of 12,686 nationally representative men and women between the ages of 14 to 21
as on December 31, 1978. The NLSY79 contains extensive information on the labor market
experience, education, family, demographics and habits of the respondents. Since 1986, the
children of the original 6,283 NLSY79 women have been assessed every two years. In addition
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to the public use les of the NLSY, I obtained information about exact date of births and
state of residence from the NLSY condential Geocode les.
Following my working paper (Barua and Lang, 2007), the school entrance age variable
was computed using data on last grade attended, interview dates and grades repeated or
skipped for children who were enrolled in school. The survey contains several questions
pertaining to grade attended and grades completed. I used this information, combined with
information on grades skipped or repeated, to compute the age at which the child entered
kindergarten. The NLSY asks the respondents questions about the last grade attended or
currently attending. One problem with the way the question is framed is that a respondent
who answered the question in January, for instance, would be referring to the grade that he
entered in the previous calendar year. To address this data limitation, I used interview dates
to verify the exact age of entrance. To be consistent, any respondent who was asked about
his last grade attended before July was assumed to have started that grade in the previous
calendar year. On the other hand any respondent who was interviewed in August or later was
assumed to be referring to the grade he entered in the current calendar year. Observations
that did not have su¢ cient information to compute the entrance ages were deleted from the
sample leaving me with a sample size of 7448 children and young adults for whom entrance
age information could be computed.
Unfortunately it is not possible to replicate the census analysis for ve year old children
using the NLSY sample. I ran into several data problems while trying to create the school
attendance variable for ve and six year old children and variables related to the mothers
labor supply. Unlike the census which has a unique census day (1stApril 1980), the NLSY is a
rolling survey. For most years a majority of interviews were scheduled over the summer. This
made it di¢ cult to interpret the school enrollment variable for ve and six year olds. For these
two age groups, I could not ascertain whether they would be enrolled in kindergarten in the
academic year beginning in Fall of the year of the interview. In addition, the mothers work
variables also corresponded to a period when the child was not enrolled in school. I could
have used a sample of mothers of ve and six year olds who were interviewed in September
or later but, when I tried to construct this sample, I was left with a very small number of
observations and the estimates obtained were very unstable. Since all children were enrolled
in school by the age of 7, none of these concerns would bias my estimates and therefore I
decided to restrict the sample to children aged 7 and above.
I construct a pooled cross section of children between the age of 7 to 10 years in the period
1980 to 2000. The mothers labor supply measures as well as all the right hand side variables
are created by the age of the child. For example, in the regressions for 7 year old children, I
include the values of the right hand side variables and the dependent variable corresponding
to the year that the child turned 7. All regressions include controls for month of birth of child,
11
year of birth dummies and dummies for the state in which the child went to kindergarten. In
addition, the regressions also include a set of controls for mothers characteristics including
race, standardized AFQT, log of husbands income, age, family size, number of children,
presence of an elderly relative, state of current residence dummies and a dummy for the
presence of a child younger than age 53.
I study the e¤ect of delayed school entry on three di¤erent measures of maternal labor
supply; employment status during the survey week, weeks worked since last interview and
usual hours worked per week in current/most recent job. The weeks worked variable is dened
as the proportion of weeks worked since last interview (weeks worked since last interview
divided by weeks since last interview). The NLSY has another accompanying variable that
tells the user the percentage of weeks unaccounted while computing weeks worked. Those
respondents who show some percentage of weeks unaccounted have missing or inconsistent
work information that does not allow an employment status for that week. In my analysis I
only keep observations for whom all weeks have been taken into account. Finally, all hourly
wages are converted to real terms ($2000) using the personal consumption expenditure price
index downloaded from http://www.bea.gov/.
4.3 State Kindergarten Entrance Age Policies
The identication strategy required knowledge of exact kindergarten entry cut-o¤ dates for
every state in the US. Data on state kindergarten entrance ages laws were gathered from
various sources to get accurate information. I gathered information on school cut-o¤ dates
for several years from the Education Commission of the States. These laws were veried
by looking at the US historical state statutes. If the history of the statute indicated a
change in the state law at any given year, I examined the relevant state session law to
determine the exact form of the change. As a result, I was able to gather information on
kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ dates for all US states for the period 1979 to 2000. Table 2
lists the kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ dates in 1979 for all states included in the sample.
Eight states (Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Vermont) that had given Local Education Authorities (LEA) the power to
set the entrance age law were deleted from the sample.
Figure 2 compares the proportion of states by the cut-o¤ month in 1979 with the corre-
sponding proportions in 2000. Most states in 1979 had fourth quarter cuto¤s, fourteen states
had September cuto¤s while ve states had January rst cuto¤s. The prevalence of fourth
quarter cuto¤s also implies that most states allowed children to enter kindergarten before
3Presence of an elderly relative in the household is dened as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
mother reports having parents, grandparents, in-laws and grandparents-in-laws living in the household during
the time of the survey.
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their fth birthday. The gure shows that in recent years there has been a trend towards
increasing the school entry age and most states are moving towards a September cut-o¤.
5 Results
5.1 OLS and 2SLS Estimates for 5 Year Old Children
Using data from the 1980 census, I estimate the e¤ect of school enrollment on the labor
supply of mothers. The analysis is done separately for three samples of women, namely,
married mother whose youngest child is ve years old, single mothers whose youngest is age
5 and married mothers with children younger than ve years old but whose ve year old is
the eldest.
The rst stage relation between the instrument and the endogenous variable provides
some useful preliminary insight into the underlying relation between the variables of interest.
Table 3 conrms that there is a very strong correlation between school eligibility and school
enrollment. For mothers of ve year olds, with no younger children, the rst stage coe¢ cient
on the instrument is equal to 0.289 and 0.328 for the regressions on single and married women
respectively. The coe¢ cient on married mothers who have younger than ve year old children
is of the order of 0.335. These coe¢ cients are very highly statistically signicant. The rst
stage F-statistics is high, 159.4 for the regressions on single women and 253.6 for the married
women regressions. In addition, the rst stage R-squared are of the order of 0.145 and 0.225
for regressions on single and married women. The rst stage regression estimates also suggest
that controlling for everything else, children born in the fourth quarter are least likely to be
enrolled in school as compared to children born in the rst quarter. The likelihood of school
attendance is declining with the quarter of birth of the child. The F-statistics suggest that
there is a strong correlation between the school attendance variable and the law enforced
school eligibility and so weak instrument problem should not be a concern in the analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 report the results from the regression of a 5 year olds school attendance on
di¤erent measures of maternal labor supply for married mothers whose youngest child is age 5.
I consider four measures of labor supply, namely, employment in 1979, weeks worked in 1979,
usual hours worked per week and labor force participation4. The endogenous explanatory
variable in these regressions is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 5 year old
is enrolled in a school and zero otherwise.
In table 4, employment in 1979 is regressed on the school enrollment dummy. I tried
4Note that two of the dependent variables are maternal labor supply measures for the year 1979. Since
school term begins in September in most states, this implies that my estimates for 5 year olds is measuring
the e¤ect of school enrollment only for the month of September and the last quarter. Therefore, it should be
kept in mind that the e¤ect of a child care subsidy for the entire year would be almost three times as large as
the estimates reported in this paper.
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probit versions of all regressions but since the results do not change much with the probit
specication, I decided to report estimates from the linear models only. Column (1) reports
the OLS estimate from a linear regression with no controls. In column (2), a rich set of
controls are added. In addition, I control for quarter of birth e¤ects as well as state xed
e¤ects. The reported heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state times
quarter of birth. The OLS estimates imply that, among married mothers, having a child
enrolled in school increases employment by 5.2 percent.
The IV estimates imply that OLS is downward biased, conrming the results obtained
in previous studies (Gelbach, 2002). This is perhaps because high income parents are more
likely to delay entry. But such parents are also more likely to continue working since they are
able to a¤ord child care costs. Controlling for quarter of birth, IV estimates in column (4)
suggest that married mothers of 5 year old children, who are enrolled in school, are 11 percent
more likely to work. This is a big e¤ect and amounts to a 18 percentage point increase in
baseline participation (the mean employment for this group is 59 percent). Comparing these
results to column (3), where I do not control for birth quarters, shows that IV estimates that
do not control for quarter of birth may be biased downwards.
In table 5, the rst row looks at the e¤ect of school attendance on usual hours worked per
week by the mother. I estimate both a linear model and a tobit model to take into account
the censored hours data. Again I nd that OLS is downward biased and IV estimates imply
an increase of 4.3 hours per week in the linear specication (column 2) and 6.8 hours per
week in the tobit specication (column 4). The mean hours worked by this sample of women
is about 20 hours per week implying a 21.5 to 34 percentage points increase in baseline hours
worked. I also report estimates from two more labor supply measures. Having a child enrolled
in school increases labor force participation by 7 percent, but this e¤ect is not statistically
signicant at conventional levels of signicance. Average weeks worked in 1979 increased by
1.64 weeks in the linear specication and 4.5 weeks in the tobit model. The IV estimates
therefore imply that having a child enrolled in school increases baseline labor supply for
married women by between 7.3 to 34 percentage points.
Note that the IV estimates, though large in magnitude, are imprecise relative to the OLS
estimates. The standard Hausman test is not applicable in this analysis due to clustered
standard errors. Instead, I use an asymptotically equivalent version of the Hausman test to
test for endogeneity. I take the residuals from the rst stage of the regression and include
it as an additional regressor in the original OLS equation. The t value on the residual is
insignicant for all the labor supply measures which suggests that endogeneity may not be
an issue here.
Table 6 and 7 estimate the corresponding labor supply equations for single mothers. The
OLS estimates for single mothers are larger than the OLS estimates for married mothers,
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but the e¤ect disappears in the IV specication. In comparison to the results for married
women, IV estimates for single women imply that having a child in school does not have
any statistically signicant e¤ect on labor supply measures. Single women with 5 year olds,
who are enrolled in schools, are 2.1 percent more likely to be employed in 1979, work about
2 hours more per week and 1.6 weeks more relative to mothers whose child is not enrolled
in school. In terms of the magnitude of this e¤ect with respect to the baseline means, this
translates to very small and statistically insignicant e¤ect of a 5 year olds school enrollment
on the labor supply measures for single women.
An obvious question that arises from these estimates is related to the di¤erence in IV
estimates for married versus single women. Several researchers have found that the labor
supply measures for single mothers are less responsive to child care prices than labor supply
measures for married mothers (Connelly 1990; Kimmel 1998; Michalopoulas et. al. 1992).
Kimmel (1998) compared the elasticity of labor supply to child care costs of married and
unmarried women and found single womens employment elasticity to be lower than married
womens. There are at least three potential reasons why one would expect the labor supply
of single women to be relatively inelastic.
First, single women are the sole bread earners for the family and their own income is
typically low. As a result they are more likely to rely on relatives and less likely to rely on
center-based arrangements or private market child care facilities (U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, 1998). Since free public schools are simply a substitute for the informal child care
provided through relatives and friends, the labor supply measures do not respond to the
availability of free schools.
Second, the e¤ect of school enrollment on the labor supply of single women is not easily
interpretable due to the complex behavioral relation between paid child care, public assistance
(such as the AFDC) and labor supply. Cash benets under AFDC are restricted to single-
parent families and families where one parent is not biologically related to the children.
Two-parent families can qualify for AFDC if both parents are unemployed. The AFDC
welfare system causes the budget constraint of single mothers to become non linear at a
threshold number of hours of work, H*. When the mother is unemployed, her family collects
welfare benets such as AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps. As she begins to work, however,
her AFDC and other benets are taxed away at a high rate. Beyond a threshold number of
hours, H*, she looses AFDC eligibility status. This could be another explanation in favor of
the results produced in this paper. The labor supply response of single women to the school
enrollment of her child may be inelastic due to the high cost associated with loosing AFDC
eligibility.
In addition, a large majority of single mothers are low educated, lack previous work
experience and have poor labor market opportunities. Having a child enrolled in school may
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not necessarily imply that these mothers have better chances of getting absorbed in well
paying jobs. Women who anticipate that they will have no more income by working, have
little incentive to work.
A good robustness check for whether the instrument identies the e¤ect of school en-
rollment on labor supply measures is to study the behavior of mothers who have younger
children at home. Women who have younger than school age children at home should not
be as a¤ected by the school attendance of her ve year old. Next, I estimate the e¤ect of
a ve year olds school attendance on the labor supply of married women with additional
children who are younger than ve years of age. Table 8 shows the coe¢ cients from 2SLS
regressions of school attendance on all four labor supply measures for this sample of women.
Column (1) reports the OLS estimates from the linear regression of all four labor supply
measures on public school attendance dummy. Column (2) reports the 2SLS estimates while
columns (3) and (4) report estimates from the tobit model for weeks of work and hours of
work. Interestingly for this group the OLS and IV have the same magnitude for three of
the four labor supply variables. However, unlike the OLS estimates, IV coe¢ cients are not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. There is a large e¤ect of school enrollment on weeks worked
in 1979, an increase of 4 weeks or 27 percent of mean weeks, in the linear model, but the
e¤ect disappears when censoring is taken into account in column (4).
To sum the results obtained from the census regressions; IV estimates imply that having a
child enrolled in school increases labor supply measures for married women, with no younger
children, by between 7 to 34 percent. In contrast to the results for married mothers, I do
not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect on labor market outcomes for single mothers or
mothers with younger than ve year old children.
5.2 Long Run E¤ect of Delayed School Entry on Maternal Labor Supply
The census results show that having a 5 year old in school increased labor supply of married
women. This is not a surprising result given that public schooling in the United States is free
and theoretically it is comparable to a 100% price subsidy on child care. A more interesting
question is related to the labor supply of mothers whose child delayed school entry. How
would the life cycle labor supply prole of these women di¤er from the labor supply prole
of women who received the subsidy a year earlier? To answer this question, I use the NLSY
to study labor supply outcomes for a pooled cross section of mothers of 7 to 10 year olds. As
discussed earlier, due to data limitations, I do not estimate the e¤ect of school enrollment of
5 or 6 year old children on maternal outcomes using data from the NLSY.
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the NLSY regressions
for a pooled cross section of married mothers of 7 year old children5. Column (1) reports
5 I replicated the analysis described in this section for single women from the NLSY. I get extremely
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means and standard deviations of variables for the entire sample of 7 year old children and
their mothers. Column (2) and (3) report descriptive statistics for the sample of 7 year old
children born before and after, respectively, the state kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤. The
last column reports t-statistics and p-values for a test of di¤erences in means from column
(2) and (3). Two things are evident from this table. First, the means suggest that mothers of
children born after the cut-o¤, and thus who delayed school entry, have higher average work
measures not controlling for any other factors. This is veried by looking at the t-values and
p-values for at least two of the three variables, namely, weeks worked and employment status.
Second, comparing the average values of the variables with the census variables (table 2) it
is clear that the NLSY sample is not di¤erent in terms of the observables. All the control
variables have similar averages across the two sample. However, the average usual hours
worked per week variable is very large in the NLSY relative to the census (34 hours and 20
hours respectively). This di¤erence is due to the di¤erent ways that the variable is measured
in the two samples. While the census reports the average hours worked per week in all jobs,
the NLSY variable reports the average hours worked per week in the current/most recent
job. Similarly, the di¤erence in the weeks worked variable is due to the di¤erent ways it is
measured in the two samples. In the NLSY it is measured as the proportion of weeks worked
since last interview after taking into consideration any unaccounted weeks by respondents.
The e¤ect of delayed school enrollment on usual hours worked per week in the main job
is shown in Table 106. Each row corresponds to the age of the child for whom the analysis
is done. As with the census estimates, I report coe¢ cients from linear and tobit models.
The rst column shows that the rst stage coe¢ cients are large and very highly statistically
signicant. OLS estimates for both linear (Column 3) and tobit (Column 5) model are
downward biased, wrong-signed, and very small and statistically insignicant in magnitude
up to age 9. The OLS and Tobit specications do not yield signicantly di¤erent results
owing to the small numbers of zeros in the work variables in the pooled NLSY sample. The
IV estimates suggest an interesting result in the pattern of hours worked. A mother of a 8
year old child, who delayed school entry, works about 4 hours more per week as compared
to a mother whose child went to school at age 5. This is true for mothers of 9 year old
children as well. By the time the child is 9 years old, these women are working 3 hours more
per week relative to the mothers whose child did not delay. The estimate using the Tobit
specication yield even larger coe¢ cients, roughly 4 hours, and are almost three times the
standard error. These numbers translate to approximately 12 percentage point increase in
baseline hours worked per week by mothers of 8 and 9 year olds who delayed school entry.
The positive e¤ect of delayed enrollment on hours worked becomes statistically insignicant
imprecise and unstable estimates for these women, conrming the results obtained from the census. Though
I have not reported these estimates, the full tables are available on request.
6The complete tables of results including the coe¢ cients on demographic covariates are available on request
17
by the time the child is 10 years old.
This result points towards intertemporal substitution in labor supply and in particular
towards signicant wealth e¤ects associated with lower lifetime wealth (gure 1). Though
the hours variable in the NLSY is the cleanest variable for this analysis, I study two other
measures of labor supply to further investigate this e¤ect.
Table 11 reports estimates from two more labor supply measures; employment status
during the interview week and proportion of weeks worked since last interview. Once again,
the OLS estimates are very small in magnitude, often wrong signed and very imprecise. The
IV estimates suggest that delayed school enrollment has long run implications for maternal
labor supply. In particular, I nd that a one year delay in school entry raises the probability
of employment of a married mother by 22 percent when the child is in school at age 7.
This translates to a increase of 36 percentage points over the mean employment. There
is a 26 percentage point increase in proportion of weeks worked since last interview. The
large positive e¤ects on maternal employment continue to persist for older children as well.
A potential concern with the weeks worked variable is that it refers to weeks worked since
last interview which may be subject to recall bias even after taking into consideration all
the unaccounted weeks. Similarly, the employment status variable refers to the respondents
employment during the interview week. There may be selection problems with both of these
variables that may bias the estimates. To check the robustness of these results, I look at the
e¤ect of delayed school enrollment on labor supply of married mothers of 8 year olds from
the Census.
I choose to look at 8 year olds for three reasons. First, by the age of 8 all children must
be enrolled in school and so there should not be any selection bias. The second reason is to
minimize measurement error while computing the entrance age. The census does not report
school entrance age of children. I use the highest grade completed and the age of the child
as of Census day, April 1st 1980, to infer the entrance age assuming that no child repeats
a grade. However, entrance age computed using this method will be distorted because of
prevalence of grade repeaters. Several studies have found that younger school entrants are
more likely to have repeated grades (Elder and Lubotsky, 2007; Barua and Lang, 2006). If
there is a large fraction of children who repeat grades then I will incorrectly specify them
to have delayed entry and this would bias the estimates. To minimize the error due to this
assumption, I look at the earliest age when all children must be in school. Finally, I look at 8
year olds because this is the age group for which I nd a signicant increase in hours worked
in the NLSY results.
I study the e¤ect of delayed school entry on maternal labor supply when the child is 8
years old. I instrument for the endogenous explanatory variable, delay, using the state law
and quarter of birth of the child as specied in equation (2). The sample consists of only
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those children for whom the state of birth and the state of residence at age 8 are identical.
This ensures that there is no mobility across states and so I can assign the correct state
cut-o¤ to the child. In addition, I restrict the sample to married mothers whose 8 year old is
her youngest child. Results from OLS and 2SLS estimates of a regression of labor supply on
"delay" are reported in table 12.
OLS is downward biased and wrong signed for all four labor supply measures. IV estimates
imply that there is a positive e¤ect on labor supply conrming the NLSY results. However
the estimates are very imprecise and, looking at the condence intervals, I cannot reject the
null. The statistical insignicance of the delay variable may simply reect measurement error,
rather than the absence of a true e¤ect on maternal labor supply. In fact in the presence of
grade repeaters, the IV would be biased downwards suggesting that the coe¢ cients would be
even larger in magnitude.
Overall, I nd strong evidence to support the intertemporal substitution hypothesis. Us-
ing the census results I nd that a child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized
kindergarten, increases a mothers net wage and thereby increases her labour supply relative
to mothers who do not receive this subsidy until a year later. When I look at older age
groups, I nd that mothers of delayed enrollers have higher labor supply compared to moth-
ers of early enrollers. This cross-sectional approach can be interpreted in a life cycle context
as discussed in Section II. For the census results, the IV estimates identify a combination
of wealth e¤ects and intertemporal substitution e¤ects corresponding to period t in gure 1.
On the other hand, the higher labor supply estimates from the NLSY can be attributed to a
pure wealth e¤ect associated with lower lifetime wealth for mothers of delayed enrollers (i.e.
period t+ 1 in gure 1).
5.3 E¤ect of Delayed School Entry on Wages
Next, I estimate the e¤ect of delayed school enrollment on maternal wages to study if the
loss in experience translates into wage e¤ects. One problem in empirically estimating a wage
function is non random selection into work. Most studies treat non workers as earning zero
wages or they drop them from the analysis. In the context of this paper, a potential problem
with dropping women who were not working is that the decision to not work may be inuenced
by the age at which the child went to school. It is possible that the mother of a "delayed"
child decides not to work because she faces lower wages relative to mothers who have worked
an additional year because they sent their child to school at age 5. In that case, dropping
them from the analysis would bias the IV estimates. Given the sizeable increase in maternal
labor supply, selection issues cannot be ignored. To correct for this selection bias, I conduct
a wage imputation exercise and compare these estimates to the results obtained by treating
non workers as having zero wages.
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The longitudinal nature of the NLSY allows me to implement a method to correct for
the sample-selection bias. The proposed imputation technique is similar in spirit to Neal
(2004)7. I exploit the panel nature of the NLSY to impute wages for those workers who were
not working in at least one of the four years of analysis. First, I convert the hourly wage
rates of the current or most recent job into real wages in 2000 dollars using the personal
consumption expenditure price index. If a woman reports as having never been employed,
I drop her from the analysis. For women who worked exactly one year during the period
when her child was between age 7 and age 10, I compute the percentile rank based on
the wage distribution for that year. I assign an imputed wage to all the missing years
that corresponds to this percentile ranking in the wage distribution at that point of time.
For women who reported working in two or three years out of the four years of analysis,
I construct a percentile ranking that is a weighted average of her percentile ranking in the
wage distributions of the observed years. The weights correspond to the inverse of the square
of the distance between the observed year and the year with the missing information. The
implicit identifying assumption is that a persons percentile ranking in the wage distribution
does not change when switching employment status.
Table 13 reports estimates obtained using this method and compares them to results ob-
tained from a wage regression without imputation. The OLS estimates suggest that mothers
of children who delayed school entry earn higher wages relative to mothers whose child was
enrolled in school at age 5. A mother of a 8 year old who delayed school entry earns 9%
higher wages (Column 2) as compared to a mother whose child went to school at age 5. This
e¤ect disappears when I instrument for delayed enrollment suggesting that OLS is biased
upwards. This is what one would expect given that rich parents are more likely to delay
school entry and the OLS estimates do not control for this e¤ect. On the other hand, the IV
estimates suggest that there is no statistically signicant relation between wages and delayed
enrollment. The point estimates are very small in magnitude and statistically insignicant
for all age groups. However, the sign on the wage coe¢ cient for mothers of 7 and 8 year olds
is what one would expect if there are any experience e¤ects. Another interesting result is
that the estimates are not highly sensitive to the wage imputation. Thus, selection bias does
not seem to be a matter of concern in this analysis.
5.4 Elasticity Estimates
A recent study by the U.S. Census Bureau provides some useful statistics that can be used to
monetize the implicit child care subsidy to parents due to a year of school enrollment8. The
7Following Neal (2004), several authors have used panel data to carry out wage imputations to estimate
median wage regressions. I use a variant of this technique to estimate OLS and IV regressions.
8"Whos Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Winter 2002" Household Economic Studies, avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-101.pdf
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study reports various aggregate child care statistics for the period 1984 to 2002 using data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). On average, working mothers,
with children younger than age 5, spend $122 in weekly child care payments. Preschool age
children, with working mothers, spent on an average 32.5 hours every week in paid child care
arrangements (including day care centers and family based day cares). This amounts to an
expenditure of $3.75 per hour in child care costs. In addition, data from the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES) suggests that the average length of school day in elementary
school is about 6.7 hours in a 180 days school year (approximately 1200 hours in a year) 9.
Thus, for mothers who would otherwise not be working, free school for their child amounts
to an average child care subsidy of $4522.5. For these women, the subsidy is a pure price
e¤ect that induces them to work. However, for mothers who choose to work more than 1200
annual hours, the subsidy has a pure wealth e¤ect and therefore reduces hours of work.
How responsive is maternal labor supply to an increase in net wage due to an implicit child
care subsidy? The challenge in estimation of labor supply elasticities is to separate the part of
the labor supply response attributable to intertemporal substitution e¤ects from the part due
to wealth e¤ects. To estimate these elasticities, one would ideally estimate the parameters of
a structural model in a life cycle setting. A formal analysis of this type is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, to compare my results with the literature that directly estimates the
elasticities, I do some "back-of-the-envelope" calculations to get a sense of the labor supply
response to intertemporal wage changes. It should be kept in mind that if there are some
women who are reducing hours because their child is receiving public education, I would be
underestimating the intertemporal and uncompensated elasticity.
The change in labor supply in period t can be decomposed into a component due to
change in wages holding the marginal utility of wealth constant and a component due to the
wealth e¤ect of a parametric permanent shift in the marginal utility of wealth. In terms of
elasticities, this can be written as:
t =  + 
@ lnt
@ lnWt
=  + t (3)
Where,  is the own uncompensated elasticity (holding constant initial wealth) of labor
supply in period t,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  refers to the wealth
e¤ect of a permanent shift in marginal utility of wealth (). Since t < 0; the intertemporal
substitution elasticity exceeds the own uncompensated elasticity i.e.  > f + tg. In the
context of this paper, the own uncompensated elasticity is given by:
t =
d lnh(t)
d lnw(t)
=
d lnh(t)
d(subsidy)
 d(subsidy)
d lnw(t)
(4)
9http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/tables/table_15.asp
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Where h is the hours worked, w is the wage and "subsidy" is the implicit child care
subsidy due to school enrollment at age 5. This may be re-written as:
5 =
dh5
d(subsidy)
 1
h5
 d(subsidy)
dw5
 w5 (5)
I can estimate this elasticity with all values evaluated at the mean:
5 = 6:8 
1
19:8
 1
3:75
 8:3 = 0:76
Where dh5d(subsidy) = 6:8 is taken from the coe¢ cient on usual hours worked per week from
Table 5 (column 4), h5 is the average hours worked per week by married women with ve
year olds (Table 1) and w5 is the average hourly wage for the same group of women.
In order to get an estimate of the wealth e¤ect, in principal I would need measures of
initial assets A(0), lifetime wage prole, interest rates, rate of time preference and unmeasured
characteristics. However, as shown in gure 1, the e¤ect of an increase in net wage on labor
supply at any period following period t may be attributed to a pure wealth e¤ect. Therefore,
the wealth elasticity of labor supply using data for mothers of 8 year old children from the
NLSY is given by (evaluated at mean):
8 = 8 = ( 4:3) 
1
34
 1
3:75
 11 =  0:37
Where dh8d(subsidy) = 4:3 is the coe¢ cient, from column 6 in Table 10, on hours worked
per week by mothers of 8 year olds. The average hours worked per week for this sample is
34 hours and the average hourly wage is $11. To get a rough estimate of the intertemporal
elasticity, I assume that the wealth e¤ects are the same in period t (corresponding to 5 year
olds) and t + 1 (corresponding to 8 year olds)10. Thus, substituting the value of  and 
into equation (3), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , is equal to 1.13. Finally,
given the value of  and , I can get bounds on the own compensated elasticity  (Macurdy,
1981). If leisure is a normal good, then,  >  > f + tg which gives bounds on the own
compensated elasticity as 1:13 >  > 0:7611:
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report the estimates of own wage uncompensated elastic-
ities from various recent studies. They nd that the median elasticity among these studies
was 0.78 for married women which is comparable to the uncompensated elasticity estimate
10 In this setting, a standard time seperable utility function yields the following conditions for the change
in labor supply in period t : dHt = t dWt
U
00
(Ht)
+ Wt
U
00
(Ht)
dt and t+ 1 : dHt+1 =
Wt+1
U
00
(Ht+1)
dt+1. Thus, wealth
e¤ects would be the same across the two periods if I assume that U 00(:) is small and Wt and Wt+1 are close
to each other.
11Using the Slutsky equation, the own compensated elasticity is given by:
 = Wt
Ht
@Ht
@Wt
jU = WtHt
@Ht
@Wt
jA0  HtWt @ lnHt@A0 =  + t  HtWt
@ lnHt
@A0
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of 0.76 obtained in this paper. The wealth elasticity estimate of -0.37 is in line with the
estimates obtained by several authors for the elasticity of married womens labor supply with
respect to nonlabor income (including assets, spouses income and other nonlabor earnings)12.
Finally, there is a wide array of estimates in the literature for the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ranging from negative values to large positive values. In the seminal econo-
metric research on life-cycle labor supply of married women, Heckman and Macurdy (1980)
nd that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for women is equal to 1. However, as
a simplifying assumption the Heckman and MaCurdy model assumes the wage prole to be
exogenous. This paper corrects for the potential bias due to the wage exogeneity assumption
that is commonly made in the intertemporal labor supply literature. My estimates of wage
elasticities suggest that previous studies have not been unduly biased by this assumption.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implication
This is the rst study that explores the dynamic aspect of the relation between school entrance
age and maternal labor supply. I exploit the variation in school entrance ages to study
maternal labor supply in an intertemporal framework. The identication strategy relies
on comparing labor supply responses, over time, for two groups of women; those whose 5
year olds were enrolled in school and those whose children delayed enrollment. One of the
advantages of this strategy is that it gives me a simple mechanism to separate wealth e¤ects
and substitution e¤ects.
Using data from the US Census, I nd that having a 5 year old enrolled in school increases
labor supply measures for married women by between 7 to 34 percentage points. In com-
parison to the results for married women, single women and married women with younger
children do not have any statistically signicant e¤ect on labor supply. These results are
consistent with theoretical models of labor supply where the provision of child care subsidies
is expected to increase the labor supply of mothers.
Using a sample of older children from the NLSY, I investigate persistence in employment
outcomes for married women whose children delayed school entry. I nd evidence consis-
tent with the intertemporal labor supply model. IV estimates imply a 12 percentage point
increase in baseline hours worked per week by mothers of 8 and 9 year olds who delayed
school entry relative to those mothers whose children were enrolled in school at age 5. This
e¤ect is attributed to the wealth e¤ect associated with lower lifetime wealth for mothers of
delayed enrollers relative to the other group. Rough calculations yield a uncompensated wage
elasticity of 0.76, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.1 and a wealth elasticity of
-0.37.
12See for example, Goldin (1990) table 5.2 and Blau and Kahn (2007).
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The choice of the right age at which to send a child to school has been a much debated
issue among parents and policy makers. Most of this discussion has emerged in the light of
the evidence, by various researchers, that older entrants perform better in test scores and are
more equipped to handle the pressure of formal schooling. Though no consensus has yet been
reached on this issue, an interesting new dimension to the debate that emerges from this paper
is that school entrance laws may a¤ect families in ways other than through child outcomes. In
particular, the evidence from this paper shows that maternal labor supply is very responsive
to school entrance ages. Moreover, an important result that comes up from my analysis
relates to the large long run wealth e¤ects associated with delaying school enrollment. These
wealth e¤ects may be especially large for low income families who are also credit constrained.
Thus, education policy makers need to keep this aspect in mind while setting the entrance
age. One potential area for future work would involve adequate modelling of intertemporal
substitution e¤ects in order to evaluate the impact of these policies on parental labor market
outcomes.
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Figure 2: Proportion of States by Kindergarten Cut-Off Month, 1980-2000 
 
 
 
Note: 
• Compiled using data from various sources  
• LEA refers to Local Education Authority 
• End of month cut offs have been clubbed with the following month. For example, a 30th 
September Cut off is counted in the month of October 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Variables for the sample of 5 Year olds 
(Census) 
 
Variable 
Married Mothers 
(youngest is 5 years 
old) 
Single Mothers 
(youngest is 5 years 
old) 
Married Mothers 
(with younger than 5-yr 
old Child) 
     
Usual Hours Worked 19.85 26.60 14.37 
 (18.98) (18.99) (18.21) 
Employment in 1979 0.59 0.72 0.45 
 (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) 
Wks Worked in 1979 22.52 29.27 14.85 
 (22.59) (22.63) (20.25) 
White 0.87 0.64 0.86 
 (0.33) (0.48) (0.34) 
Age 32.57 29.97 29.21 
 (5.39) (5.85) (4.47) 
Education 12.24 11.74 12.33 
 (2.54) (2.42) (2.80) 
Log(Spouse’s) Income 8.63  8.57 
 (3.01)  (2.98) 
Number of Children 2.35 2.03 2.92 
 (1.17) (1.25) (1.18) 
# of Adult Members 1.15 0.65 1.11 
 (0.49) (1.04) (0.44) 
SMSA 0.75 0.81 0.74 
 (0.44) (0.39) (0.45) 
Head of Household 0.03 0.80 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.40) (0.15) 
Total Sample Size  42,500 11,690 41,795 
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Table 2: Kindergarten Entrance Age Laws in 1979 for US States 
 
State State Cut Off 
Date 
State Cut Off 
Month* 
Alabama 1 October 
Alaska 2 November 
Arizona 1 January 
Arkansas 1 October 
California 1 December 
Connecticut 1 January 
Delaware 1 January 
DC 31 December 
Florida 1 January 
Georgia 1 September 
Hawaii 31 December 
Idaho 16 October 
Illinois 1 December 
Iowa 15 September 
Kansas 1 September 
Kentucky 1 October 
Maine 15 October 
Maryland 31 December 
Michigan 1 December 
Minnesota 1 September 
Mississippi 1 January 
Missouri 1 October 
Montana 10 September 
Nebraska 15 October 
Nevada 30 September 
New Mexico 1 September 
New York 1 December 
North Carolina 16 October 
North Dakota 1 October 
Ohio 30 September 
Oklahoma 1 November 
Oregon 15 November 
Rhode Island 31 December 
South Carolina 1 November 
South Dakota 1 September 
Tennessee 31 October 
Texas 1 September 
Utah 1 September 
Virginia 1 December 
Washington 31 August 
West Virginia 1 September 
Wisconsin 1 September 
Wyoming 15 September 
 
Source: Education Commission of States, State Legal Statutes 
*The States of Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and Vermont were deleted from the sample because the eligibility age was set by the Local Education 
Authority (LEA) in these states.  
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Table 3: Summary of First Stage Regressions for 5 Year Olds from Census Data (Just Identified 
Model) 
 
 Married Mothers  
(no younger 
children) 
Single Mothers 
(no younger 
children) 
Married Mothers 
(younger than 5 
year old) 
Coefficient on the Instrument  0.328*** 
(0.021) 
 0.289*** 
(0.023) 
 0.335*** 
(0.034) 
Quarter of Birth 2 -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Quarter of Birth 3 -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015** 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
Quarter of Birth 4 -0.063*** 
(0.015) 
-0.046** 
(0.020) 
-0.109*** 
(0.032) 
White -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Education (Mother)  0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
# of Adult Family Members 
 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Log (Spouse’s Income) 
 
 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
  0.003*** 
(0.000) 
# Own Children in the Household -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0002) 
SMSA  0.037*** 
(0.007) 
 0.020** 
(0.009) 
 0.028*** 
(0.006) 
Household Head  0.000 
(0.011) 
 0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Age (Mother)  0.022*** 
(0.003) 
 0.007 
(0.004) 
 0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Age Square -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
F (test of excluded instrument)  253.62  159.44 
 
 96.92 
P value of F-statistic for the 
Instrument 
 0.0000  0.0000 
 
 0.000 
 
Centered R-Squared  0.225  0.145 
 
 0.248 
 
Partial R-Squared  0.031  0.025  0.027 
Sample Size  37246  10700  36941 
Heteroskedasticity Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Regressions also include State Fixed Effects 
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Table 4: Effect of 5-Year Olds Public School Attendance on 1979 Employment Status for 
Married Mothers (with no younger children) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
School attendance 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.106** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.052) 
White  -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Mothers Education  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
# of HH Adult Members  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Spouse's Income)  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
# of own children  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SMSA  -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Head  0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age  -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age Squared  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 42500 37246 37246 37246 
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 
     
State Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter of Birth 
Dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
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Table 5: Effect of 5-Year Olds Public School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Married 
Mothers (with no Younger Children) 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit 
     
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  1.421***   4.268** 2.766***  6.764** 
 (0.453)  (1.782) (0.740) (2.948) 
Labor Force Status  0.074***   0.071   
 (0.014)  (0.059)   
Weeks Worked in 1979  2.924***   1.625  8.082*** 4.482 
 (0.539) (2.050) (1.428) (3.290) 
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sample size is 37246 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of 5-Year Olds Public School Attendance on 1979 Employment Status for Single 
Mothers (with no younger children) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
School attendance 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.053* 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.031) (0.056) 
White  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Mothers Education  0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
# of Adult HH Members  0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
# of own children   -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SMSA  -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Household Head  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age  0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age Squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 11690 10700 10700 10700 
R-squared 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter of Birth 
Dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
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Table 7: Effect of 5-Year Olds Public School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Single 
Mothers (with no Younger Children) 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit 
     
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  2.506***   0.187  3.849***  0.247 
 (0.654)  (2.919) (0.949) (3.721) 
Labor Force Status  0.082*** - 0.028   
 (0.018)  (0.075)   
Weeks Worked in 1979  3.996***   1.656  10.287***  1.426 
 (0.786)  (3.433) (2.070) (4.263) 
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sample Size = 10700 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Effect of 5-Year Olds Public School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Married 
Mothers with Younger than 5 Year Old Children 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 
Worked in 1979 
 
 0.051*** 
 
  0.052 
  
 (0.009)  (0.036)   
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  1.253***   1.096  3.431***  3.517 
 (0.360)  (1.286) (0.787) (2.743) 
Labor Force Status  0.052***   0.050   
 (0.010)  (0.034)   
Weeks Worked in 1979  1.942***   4.124***  6.452*** 3.767 
 (0.378) (1.521) (1.175) (2.469) 
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sample size = 36941 
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Table 9: Means and Standard Deviation of Variables for a sample Married Mothers of 7 Year old 
Children (NLSY) 
 
    
 Sample of 7 Year Olds  
Variable 
Entire 
Sample  
(1) 
Born Before 
the cut off 
(2) 
Born After the 
cut off 
(3) 
t-test 
(Difference in 
means is zero)1 
(4) 
      
Usual Hrs Worked 33.80 33.65 34.23 -0.96 
 (12.67) (12.53) (13.08) (0.3340) 
Employment 0.61 0.60 0.64 -2.33 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.0199) 
Weeks Worked 0.58 0.57 0.61 -2.37 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.0176) 
Black  0.19 0.18 0.21 -2.36 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.0183) 
Hispanics 0.22 0.23 0.20 1.93 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.0531) 
Mothers AFQT -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -1.22 
 (0.95) (0.96) (0.92) (0.2206) 
Mothers Grade 12.33 12.32 12.36 -0.40 
 (2.42) (2.46) (2.27) (0.6915) 
Mothers Age 30.82 30.97 30.36 3.53 
 (4.32) (4.33) (4.24) (0.0004) 
Ln(Spouse’s) Income          8.76 8.80 8.62 1.27 
 (3.39) (3.38) (3.46) (0.2028) 
Child less than 5 0.53 0.53 0.54 -0.99 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.3187) 
Number of Children 2.61 2.61 2.60 0.39 
 (1.07) (1.09) (1.03) (0.6936) 
Family size 4.68 4.68 4.67 0.17 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.17) (0.8615) 
Elderly in Household 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.69 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.4884) 
Observations 3803 2886 (75.89%) 917 (24.11%)  
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Table 10: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Usual Hours Worked per Week by Married 
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY) 
 
Age of Child 
   (1) 
First Stage 
   
(2) 
OLS 
  
 (3) 
2SLS 
  
 (4) 
Tobit 
  
 (5) 
IV Tobit 
   
(6) 
Observations 
   
(7) 
Age 7 0.58*** -0.91 0.66 -0.78 0.87 2177 
 (0.03) (0.71) (1.72) (0.70) (1.75)  
Age 8 0.53*** -0.73 4.13** -0.75 4.31** 1994 
 (0.03) (0.81) (1.97) (0.79) (1.85)  
Age 9 0.58*** -0.76 3.12** -0.57 4.17*** 1879 
 (0.03) (0.86) (1.45) (0.82) (1.40)  
Age 10 0.55*** -2.04** -1.89 -1.94** -1.29 1659 
 (0.03) (0.85) (2.11) (0.82) (1.99)  
 
 
Table 11: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Employment and Weeks Worked by Married 
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY) 
 
Age of Child 
  (1) 
First Stage 
  
 (2) 
OLS 
  
 (3) 
2SLS 
  
 (4) 
Tobit 
   
(5) 
IV Tobit 
   
(6) 
Observations 
 
  (7) 
       
          I. Employment  
Age 7 0.59*** 0.04* 0.22***   2874 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)    
Age 8 0.56*** -0.02 0.02   2629 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)    
Age 9 0.57*** 0.04 0.17***   2392 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)    
Age 10 0.54*** -0.00 0.14**   2054 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)    
       
            II. Weeks Worked  
Age 7 0.59*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.01 0.19*** 2871 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)  
Age 8 0.56*** 0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.12** 2623 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)  
Age 9 0.56*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.01 0.20*** 2399 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)  
Age 10 0.53*** -0.02 0.12* -0.01 0.17** 2056 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08)  
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Table 12: Effect of Delayed Enrollment on Labor Supply Measures of Married Mothers of 8 year 
olds (no Younger Children) 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 
Worked in 1979 
 
-0.009 
 
  0.009 
  
 (0.008)  (0.037)   
Usual Hrs Worked/Week -0.249   1.414 -0.410  1.449 
 (0.360)  (1.370) (0.787) (2.129) 
Labor Force Status -0.007  -0.039   
 (0.008)  (0.034)   
Weeks Worked in 1979 -0.988***   1.002 -2.429** 1.322 
 (0.369)  (1.82) (0.998) (2.340) 
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sample size = 29053 
 
 
 
Table 13: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Log (Hourly Wage) Earned by Married 
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY) 
 
Age of Child 
    
  OLS 
(Imputed 
Wage) 
  IV 
(Imputed 
Wage) 
Observations 
   
OLS 
   
  IV  
 
Observations 
 
 
Age 7 
 
0.032 
 
-0.024 
 
2221 
 
0.044 
 
-0.046 
 
2096 
 (0.036) (0.074)  (0.040) (0.080)  
Age 8 0.087** -0.038 2149 0.095** -0.002 1931 
 (0.037) (0.089)  (0.044) (0.091)  
Age 9 -0.042 -0.050 1952 -0.009 0.009 1816 
 (0.041) (0.090)  (0.042) (0.084)  
Age 10 0.076*  0.072 1811 0.100** 0.045 1608 
 (0.041) (0.093)  (0.039) (0.089)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
